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Abstract - A Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) is characterized 
by mobile nodes, multihop wireless connectivity, 
infrastructureless environment and dynamic topology. The 
adhoc environment is accessible to both legitimate network 
users and malicious attackers. Moreover, as the wireless links 
are highly error prone and can go down frequently due to 
mobility of nodes, therefore, stable and secure routing over 
MANET is still a very critical task due to highly dynamic 
environment.  In this research paper, a new protocol SSRP 
(Stable and Secured Routing Protocol) has been proposed. An 
experimental analysis of proposed protocol (SSRP) and 
existing protocol (AODV) has been carried out using network 
simulator ns-2. An effort has been made to perform analysis 
using random way point mobility model. The results have been 
derived using a self created network scenarios for varying 
number of mobile nodes. The same scenario is executed for 
both the protocols to analyze the performance. The 
performance metrics used for evaluation are packet delivery 
ratio, average end to end delay, throughput, normalized 
routing load and packet loss. Based on the experimental 
analysis, recommendations have been made about the 
significance of either protocol in various situations. It has been 
concluded that the proposed protocol i.e. SSRP provides a 
robust, stable and secured routing strategy for mobile adhoc 
networks. 
IndexTerms  :  MANET, Routing, Secured, SSRP, Stable 
 
ANET is a collection of wireless mobile nodes 
forming a temporary network without any fixed 
infrastructure where all nodes are free to move 
about arbitrarily and where all the nodes configure 
themselves. Unlike traditional networks whereby routing 
functions are performed by dedicated nodes or routers, 
in MANET, routing functions are carried out by all 
available nodes. There are no fixed base stations and 
each node acts both as a router and as a host. The 
mobile nodes in the adhoc network dynamically 
establish routing among themselves to form their own 
network ‗on the fly‘. In essence, the network is created in 
ad-hoc fashion by the participating nodes without any 
central administration. Further adhoc networks can be 
classified 
  
as
  
 single-hop 
  
or   multi-hop.  In single-hop  
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adhoc networks, nodes are in their reach area and can 
communicate directly but in case of multi-hop, some 
nodes are far and cannot communicate directly. 
The traffic has to be forwarded by other 
intermediate nodes. Adhoc networks are primarily meant 
for use by military forces or for emergency rescue 
situations. At the state of war an army cannot rely on 
fixed infrastructure because it is an easy and attractive 
target for the enemy. Adhoc networks are optimal 
solution in such cases. For civil use adhoc networks are 
crucial if the fixed infrastructure has been torn down by 
some natural disaster, like a flood or an earthquake. 
Then rescue operations could in such a situation be 
managed through utilizing adhoc networks. Security is 
an important issue for adhoc networks, especially for 
those security-sensitive applications. The dilemma is 
that how should it be judged whether the mobile adhoc 
network is secure or not. Some of the main security 
attributes [1, 2] that are used to inspect the security 
state of the mobile adhoc network are availability, 
integrity, Confidentiality, Authenticity, Non repudiation, 
Authorization and Anonymity. 
In mobile adhoc networks, radio transmission is 
the most common means of communication. 
Eavesdropping on a node is far easier than in wired 
networks. Since intermediate nodes no longer belong to 
a trusted infrastructure, but may be eavesdroppers as 
well, consequent end-to-end encryption is mandatory. 
Next, as all nodes in an Adhoc network cooperate in 
order to discover the network topology and forward 
packets, denial of service attacks on the routing function 
are very easy to mount. Nodes may create stale or 
wrong routes, creating black holes or routing loops. 
Furthermore, in adhoc networks exists a strong 
motivation for non-participation in the routing system. 
Both the routing system and the forwarding of foreign 
packets consume a node‘s battery power, CPU time, 
and bandwidth, which are restricted in mobile devices. 
Consequently, selfish nodes may want to save their 
resources for own use. There are three main causes for 
a node not to work according to the common routing 
protocol. Malfunctioning nodes are simply suffering from 
a hardware failure or a programming error. Although this 
is not an attack, they may cause severe irritation in the 
routing system of an adhoc network. Selfish nodes try to 
save their own resources, as described above. 
Malicious nodes are trying to sabotage other nodes or 
even the whole network, or compromise security in 
M 
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some way. Before developing a security framework that 
prevents selfish or malicious nodes from harming the 
network, it is worthwhile to first create a structured 
overview on what kinds of attacks are possible in adhoc 
networks. Network security attacks [1, 2] are typically 
divided into two categories as passive and active 
attacks which has been shown in table 1. 
In passive attacks, the malicious entity only 
listens to the traffic, without modifying or disturbing it in 
any way. It can be either eavesdropping or traffic 
analysis. In an active attack, the malignant node actively 
disturbs the normal operation of the network and an 
unauthorized party makes modifications to a message, 
data stream or file. Active attacks may take the form of 
one of four types: masquerading, replay, message 
modification, and denial-of-service (DoS).  
 
Table 1 Passive Vs. Active Attacks 
 
Passive attacks: Eavesdropping, traffic analysis
 
Active attacks:
 
Masquerading, Replaying, Message 
modification, DoS
 
 
 
Security has become a primary concern in order 
to provide protected communication between mobile 
nodes in a hostile environment. The salient features of 
adhoc networks pose both challenges and opportunities 
in achieving the aforementioned goals. First,
 
use
 
of 
wireless links renders an adhoc network susceptible to 
link attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to 
active impersonation, message replay, and message 
distortion. Eavesdropping might give an adversary 
access to secret information, violating confidentiality. 
Active attacks might allow the adversary to delete 
messages, to inject erroneous messages, to modify 
messages, and to impersonate a node, thus violating 
availability, integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation. Secondly, nodes, roaming in a hostile 
environment e.g. in a battlefield with relatively poor 
physical protection, have non-negligible probability of 
being compromised. Therefore, one should not only 
consider malicious attacks from outside a network, but 
also take into account the attacks launched from within 
the network by compromised nodes. Therefore, to 
achieve high survivability, adhoc networks should have 
a distributed architecture with no central entities. 
Introducing any central entity into our security solution 
could lead to significant vulnerability; that is, if this 
centralized entity is compromised, then the entire 
network is subverted. Thirdly,
 
an adhoc network is 
dynamic because of frequent changes in both its 
topology and its membership. Trust relationship among 
nodes also changes, for example, when certain nodes 
are detected as being compromised. Unlike other 
wireless mobile networks, such as mobile IP, nodes in 
an adhoc network may dynamically become affiliated 
with administrative domains. Any security solution with a 
static configuration would not suffice. It is desirable for 
our security mechanisms to adapt on-the-fly to these 
changes. Finally, an adhoc network may consist of 
hundreds or even thousands of nodes. Security 
mechanisms should be scalable to handle such a large 
network.  
These challenges motivate for building multi 
fence security solutions that achieve both broad 
protection and desirable network performance. In this 
paper our focus is on the fundamental security problem 
of protecting the multihop network connectivity between 
mobile nodes in a MANET. Efforts are to review the 
state-of-the-art security proposals that protect the 
MANET link layer and network layer operations of 
delivering packets over the multihop wireless channel. 
The complete security solution should span both layers, 
and encompass all three security components of 
prevention, detection, and reaction. 
 
MANETs are extremely vulnerable to attacks 
due to their dynamically changing topology, absence of 
conventional security infrastructures and open medium 
of communication, which, unlike their wired 
counterparts, cannot be secured with ease. MANET 
security involves authentication, key establishment and 
distribution, and encryption. Despite the fact that 
security of adhoc routing protocols is causing a major 
roadblock in commercial applications of this technology, 
only a limited work has been done in this area. Such 
efforts have mostly concentrated on the aspect of data 
forwarding, disregarding the aspect of topology 
discovery. On the other hand, solutions that target route 
discovery have been based on approaches for fixed-
infrastructure networks, defying the particular adhoc 
network challenges. To address these concerns, several 
secure routing protocols have been studied. Dahill et al. 
proposed ARAN [3], it assumes managed-open 
environment, where there is a possibility for pre-
deployment of infrastructure. It consists of two distinct 
stages. The first stage is the certification and end-to-end 
authentication stage. In this, source gets a certificate 
from the trusted certification server and then using this 
certificate signs the request packet. Each intermediate 
node in turn signs the request with its certificate. The 
destination then verifies each of the certificates, thus the 
source gets authenticated and so do the intermediate 
nodes. The destination node then sends the reply along 
the route reverse to the one in the request; reply signed 
using the certificate of the destination. The second stage 
is a non-mandatory stage which is used to discover the 
shortest path to the destination but this stage is 
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computationally expensive. It is prone to reply attacks 
using error messages unless the nodes have time 
synchronization. Papadimitratos and Haas [4] proposed 
a protocol SRP that can be applied to several existing 
routing protocols. This protocol assumes a security 
association between source and destination nodes. 
Intermediate nodes do not need to cryptographically 
validate the control traffic. It adds a SRP header to the 
base routing protocol, DSR or AODV, request packet. 
SRP header has three important fields QSEQ which 
helps prevent replay of old outdated requests, QID and 
random number which helps prevent fabrication of 
requests and a SRP MAC which ensures integrity of the 
packets in transit. SRP requires that, for every route 
discovery, source and destination must have a security 
association between them. Furthermore, the paper does 
not even mention route error messages. Therefore, they 
are not protected and any malicious node can just forge 
error messages with other nodes as source. ARIADNE 
[5], is based on DSR [6] and TESLA [7]. It prevents 
attackers/compromised nodes from disrupting 
uncompromised routes comprising of benign nodes.  It 
uses highly efficient symmetric key cryptography.  It 
does not guard against passive attackers 
eavesdropping on the network traffic. It does not prevent 
an attacker from inserting data packets. It is vulnerable 
to active-1-1 attacker that lies along the discovered 
route, who does not forward packets and does not 
generate ERROR if it encounters a broken link. It also 
requires clock synchronization, which is considered to 
be an unrealistic requirement for adhoc networks. 
Perlman proposed a link state routing protocol [8] that 
achieves Byzantine Robustness. Although the protocol 
is highly robust, it requires a very high overhead 
associated with public key encryption. Zhou and Haas 
[9] primarily discussed key management. They devote a 
section to secure routing, but essentially conclude that 
―nodes can protect routing information in the same way 
they protect data traffic‖. They also observe that denial-
of-service attacks against routing will be treated as 
damage and routed around. Some work has been done 
to secure adhoc networks by using misbehavior 
detection schemes [10].  This approach has two main 
problems: first, it is quite likely that it will be not feasible 
to detect several kinds of misbehaving; and second has 
no real means to guarantee the integrity and 
authentication of the routing messages.  Looking at the 
work that has been done in this area previously, it 
seems that the security needs for adhoc networks has 
not been yet satisfied. Most of the work done around 
using Hashing techniques is around authenticating 
messages and route table entries. Bayya et al. [11] 
demonstrate the use of hashing as part of password 
based authenticated key exchange. The problems in this 
protocol are the need of a strong shared secret and the 
need to constantly change the shared secret which in 
turn may prove to be computationally expensive. Yih-
Chun Hu et al. [12] used symmetric cryptography to 
secure adhoc networks by using one way hash chains 
or Markle hash tree as part of SEAD protocol for 
proactive routing. In this protocol the elements of hash 
chain are used directly to authenticate the sequence 
number and other metric in each entry. The problems 
identified with SEAD protocol are no provision of a 
secure initial key distribution, greater network traffic and 
count-to-infinity problem. Zapata [13] in its proposed 
protocol uses a new one-way hash chain for each Route 
Discovery to secure the metric field in an RREQ packet. 
It also uses asymmetric cryptography to initially 
authenticate participating nodes.  
 
A ‗hash‘ (‗digest‘ and informally a ‗checksum‘) 
is a kind of ‗signature‘ for a stream of data that 
represents the contents. Cryptographic hashing [14] is 
used for data/user verification and authentication. A 
strong cryptographic hash function has the property of 
being very difficult to reverse the result of the hash and 
hence reproduce the original piece of data. The hash 
functions are typically defined by the way they create 
hash values from data. There are two main 
methodologies for a hash algorithm to implement as: 
 
a)
 
Additive And Multiplicative Hashing
 
The hash value is constructed by traversing 
through the data and continually incrementing an initial 
value by a calculated value relative to an element within 
the data. The calculation done on the element value is 
usually in the form of a multiplication
 
by a prime number 
[14] as given in equations (1) to (4). 
 
 
  
 b)
 
Rotative Hashing
 
This is same as additive hashing. In that every 
element in the data string is used to construct the hash 
but unlike additive hashing, the values are put through a 
process of bitwise shifting [14]. Usually a combination of 
both left and right shifts is used
 
(shift amounts are 
prime). The result of each process is added to some 
form of accumulating count, the final result being the 
hash value is passed back as the final accumulation as 
given in equations (5) to (7). 
 
 
-----
 
(1)
 -----
 
(2)
 -----
 
(3)
 -----
 
(4)
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----- (5)
----- (6)
----- (7)
  
 
 
The popular examples of hashing functions [11] 
are HMAC, SHA-1 and MD5.
 
 
In AODV protocol, it is assumed that the 
malicious node has exceptionally large sequence 
number. Whenever a malicious node joins the network, 
the packets start dropping and link path breakage 
happens as shown in figure 1. The proposed scheme is 
based on modifications of existing AODV. Two 
parameters have been used, one for stability and other 
for security. The proposed protocol, SSRP, ensures 
stable and secure routing over the adhoc network. 
 
Whenever a link path breakage occurs, stable 
routing is achieved with an alternate route selection 
using neighbour nodes. If there is an attack on security 
of the network, the hash key chain mechanism is used 
to 
 
ensure   secure   routing.   This  
 
has
  
been 
 
shown 
 
in 
 
figure 2.
 
The solution proposed stresses upon applying 
hashing techniques not only in prevention stage in the 
form of message and routing information authentication, 
but also in different stages of securing adhoc networks. 
A unique way of using hash functions as ‗one way hash 
chain‘ has been used in the proposed work. Hash key 
chains are constructed by using only symmetric 
cryptographic primitives, namely hash functions. A hash 
key chain is configured as a recursive chain, where the 
node first chooses a random key, K1.  Subsequent keys 
[15, 16, 17] are calculated by calculating the one-way 
hash over the key as given in equation (8):    
 
 
K2=H [K1], K3=H [K2], 
 
……………,
 
KN=[KN-1]         
 
 
                                                                  -----
 
(8)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:
 
Route prior to malicious node entry in AODV
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2
 
:
 
Route recovery using alternate path in SSRP
 
 
The algorithm behind the proposed protocol is 
given below with the following assumptions:
 
Assumptions:
 
a)
 
The source node ‗S‘ and destination node ‗D‘ are 
not malicious.
 
b)
 
The sequence number is in ascending order from 
‗S‘ to ‗D‘.
 
c)
 
One hop has increment of one sequence number.
 
d)
 
Total hops can be counted before route selection.
 
 
Step 1:
 
The sequence number of each and 
every node is updated at each beacon.
 
Step 2
 
:
 
Whenever a node with exceptionally 
large sequence number is detected, it means malicious 
node has entered into the network.
 
Step 3
 
:
 
If a malicious node has entered into the 
network during transmission of data from source to 
destination, an alternate route is selected. 
 
Step 4
 
:
 
The secure routing is ensured using 
equation 8 which is used by any node to authenticate 
any received value on the hash chain. If the computed 
value matches previous known authentic key value then 
the received key is authentic. 
 
Step 5
 
:
 
Each node discloses each key of its 
one-way key chain in a particular order, which is exactly 
reverse of the order in which the keys were generated. 
The key disclosure schedule and key generation 
schedule should be reverse For example if the keys 
were generated by a node in the order KN; KN-1; …..K1; 
K0
 
then the node disclose them in the order K0; K1; …. 
KN. The rationale behind having the key disclosure 
schedule to be reverse of the key generation schedule is 
that KN
 
of a node is known to all other nodes and in 
such a situation they should be able to authenticate any 
subsequent keys that are disclosed. The use of one way 
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Packet
Drop
Source
Link 
Breakage
Malicious Node
Destination
Packet
Drop
Source
Link 
Breakage
Malicious Node
_______   : Route prior to malicious node entry in AODV
_ _ _ _     : Alternate route selection by SSRP 
Destination
hash function allows K0; K1 ; …. KN-1   to be 
authenticated using KN but KN cannot be authenticated 
  
 
  
using any other key value. Hence the key disclosure 
schedule and key generation schedule is reverse. 
 
Step 6:
 
The transmission of route request and 
route reply is analyzed as under:
 
Transmission of RREQ packet
 
A parameter ‗node_type‘ is used which is set to 
‗0‘ (non-malicious) or ‗1‘ (malicious). RREQ packet is 
broadcasted by Source. If non-malicious, broadcast 
RREQ to current node else deactivate the node and 
don‘t broadcast RREQ. Process continues till it reaches 
Destination. 
 
Transmission of RREP packet
 
Destination node ‗D‘ rebroadcast the RREP 
packet like the RREQ. All the possible routes will be 
searched by RREP. If any node is out of signal range or 
dead from the network after getting RREQ then available 
route will be selected by the RREP broadcasting.  
 
 RFC 2501 describes a number of quantitative 
metrics that can be used for evaluating the performance 
of a routing protocol for mobile wireless ad-hoc 
networks. Some of these quantitative metrics [18] are 
defined as follow:
 
a)
 
Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF)
 
The packet delivery fraction is defined as the 
ratio of number of data packets received at the 
destinations over the number of data packets sent by 
the sources as given in equation (9). This performance 
metric is used to determine the efficiency and accuracy 
of MANET‘s routing protocols.
 
Packet Delivery Fraction = 
Sent
 
Packets
 
Data
 
Total
Received
 
Packets
 
Data
 
Total
 
X 100                          
                                                                                                    -----
 
(9)
 
b)
 
Average End-to-End Delay (AE2ED)
 
This is the average time involved in delivery of 
data packets from the source node to the destination 
node. To compute the average end-to-end delay, add 
every delay for each successful data packet delivery 
and divide that sum by the number of successfully 
received data packets as given in equation (10). This 
metric is important in delay sensitive applications such 
as video and voice transmission.
 Average End to End Delay = 
Received
 
Packets
 
Data
 
Total
Sent)
 
Time
 
-
 
Received
 
(Time
                                                                                                  -----
 
(10)
 
c)
 
Network Throughput 
 
A network throughput is the average rate at
which message is successfully delivered between a 
destination node (receiver) and source node (sender). It 
is also referred to as the ratio of the amount of data 
received from its sender to the time the last packet 
reaches its destination. Throughput can be measured as 
bits per second (bps), packets per second or packet per 
time slot. For a network, it is required that the throughput 
is at high-level. Some factors that affect MANET‘s 
throughput are unreliable communication, changes in 
topology, limited energy and bandwidth.
 
d)
 
Normalized Routing Load (NRL)
 
The normalized routing load is defined as the 
fraction of all routing control packets sent by all nodes 
over the number of received data packets at the 
destination nodes. In other words, it is the ratio between 
the total numbers of routing packets sent over the 
network to the total number of data packets received as 
given in equation (11).  This metric discloses how 
efficient the routing protocol is. Proactive protocols are 
expected to have a higher normalized routing load than 
reactive ones. The bigger this fraction is the less efficient 
the protocol.
 Normalized Routing Load = 
Received
 
Packets
 
Data
 
Total
Sent
 
Packets
 
Routing
 
Total
   
                                                                                         -----
 
(11)
 
e)
 
Packet Loss (PL)
 
Packet
 
loss
 
occurs when one or more packets
being transmitted across the network fail to arrive at the 
destination. It is defined as the number of packets 
dropped by the routers during transmission. It can be 
shown by equations (12) to (14).
 
Packet Loss = Total Data Packets Dropped
 
   
  
                                                   -----
 
(12)
 
Packet Loss = Total Data Packets Sent –
 
Total Data Packets 
Received
  
                                           -----
 
(13)
 Packet Loss (%age) = 
Sent
 
Packets
 
Data
 
Total
Dropped
 
Packets
 
Total
 
X 100 
                                                                     -----
 
(14)
 
 
In this research paper, performance of the 
proposed protocol ‗SSRP‘ is evaluated with respect to 
‗AODV‘ using these performance metrics.
 
 
IEEE 802.11 is used as the MAC layer protocol.
 
The simulation experiments are carried over network 
simulator 2 (version 2.34) installed in Fedora Linux 12.
The results have been derived by writing a tcl script and 
generating corresponding trace
 
and nam
 
files. Varying 
number of UDP connections/traffic agents have been 
used to analyze the traffic. The mobility model used is 
random waypoint model in a square area. The area 
configurations used are 750 meter x 750 meter for 20 
nodes, 1000 meter x 1000 meter for 50 nodes and 1500 
meter x 1500 meter for 80 nodes. The packet size is 512 
bytes. The simulation run time is 500 seconds during 
analysis of 20 nodes, 700 seconds for 50 nodes and 
950 seconds for 80 nodes. 
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a) Snapshots of Simulation Environment
An extensive simulation model having scenario 
of 20, 50 and 80 mobile nodes is used to study inter-
  
  layer interactions and their performance implications. 
Same scenario has been used for performance 
evaluation of both SSRP and AODV protocols at one 
time. Some of the snapshots of trace and NAM files 
created using AODV and SSRP protocols for 50 nodes 
are shown in figure 3 to 6.
 
 
 
 
Figure 3
 
:
 
NAM File using AODV (50 Nodes)
 
 
 
Figure 4
 
: Trace File using AODV (50 nodes)
 
 
Figure 5
 
:
 
NAM File using SSRP (50 Nodes)
 
 
Figure
 
6
 
:
 
Trace File using SSRP (50 Nodes)
 
 
A graphical tool known as Network Animator is 
used to observe the visual representation of NAM files 
created during simulation of 50 nodes. The snapshots of 
visual representations taken at two different times t1= 
138.942153 Sec. and t2= 138.974673 Sec. are given in 
figure 7 and 8. 
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Figure 7 : Position at time t1= 138.942153 Seconds (50 
Nodes)
  
  
 
 Figure 8
 
:
 
Position at time t2= 138.974673 Seconds (50 
Nodes)
 
 b)
 
Simulation Results for 20 Nodes
 
All the performance metrics have been 
evaluated for SSRP and AODV protocols using 6 UDP 
connections. All nodes are moving at a fixed speed of 5 
meters/second. Two malicious nodes have been 
introduced in the network scenarios which are moving at 
a speed of 1 meter/second. The pause time has been 
used as a varying parameter from 100 seconds to 500 
seconds and the queue length is 150. 
 
Figure 9 shows packet delivery fraction with 
respect to pause time. The observation is that SSRP 
gives high packet delivery fraction that AODV and there 
is a significant positive difference. Therefore, SSRP 
protocol outperforms AODV in terms of stable and 
secure routing over MANET. In figure 10, average end to 
end delay has been presented with respect to pause 
time. When the pause time is 100 seconds, AODV has 
high average end to end delay than SSRP but after that 
AODV and SSRP gives almost same results. On an 
average, SSRP outperforms AODV.  The network 
throughput with respect to pause time has been shown 
in figure 11. The protocol having high network 
throughput is more efficient and in this figure, SSRP 
gives high throughput than AODV. Therefore, SSRP 
outperforms AODV in terms of throughput. Figure 12 
shows normalized routing load by varying pause time. 
The bigger this fraction is the less efficient the routing 
protocol. When the pause time is between 100 seconds 
to 300 seconds, AODV shows bigger NRL than SSRP 
but after that both SSRP and AODV gives almost same 
results. On an average, SSRP outperforms AODV in 
terms of normalized routing load. In figure 13, the packet 
loss has been shown for both protocols. Higher the 
packet loss, less efficient is routing protocol and in this 
figure, AODV gives high packet loss than AODV. 
Therefore, SSRP outperforms than AODV in terms of 
packet loss. 
 
 
Figure 9
 
:
 
Packet Delivery Fraction (20 Nodes)
 
 
 
Figure 10
 
:
 
Average End to End Delay (20 Nodes)
 
 
 
Figure 11:
 
Network Throughput (20 Nodes)
 
 
 
Figure 12
 
:
 
Normalized Routing Load (20 Nodes)
 
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
 V
ol
um
e 
X
II
 I
ss
ue
  
IV
  
V
er
si
on
 I
 
  
  
   
  
27
  
 
  
20
12
Fe
br
ua
r y
  
 
Figure 13  :  Packet Loss (20 Nodes)  
 
c) Simulation Results for 50 Nodes 
All the performance metrics have been 
evaluated for SSRP and AODV protocols using 10 UDP 
connections. All nodes are moving at a fixed speed of 
10 meters/second. Two malicious nodes have been 
introduced in the network scenarios which are moving at 
a speed of 5 meters/second. The pause time has been 
used as a varying parameter from 100 seconds to 700 
seconds and the queue length is 150. 
In figure 14, packet delivery fraction is shown 
with respect to pause time for SSRP and AODV. The 
observation is that SSRP gives high packet delivery 
fraction that AODV and therefore, SSRP protocol 
outperforms AODV in terms of better packet delivery.  
In figure 15, average end to end delay has been 
presented with respect to pause time. When the pause 
time is between 100 seconds to 200 seconds, AODV 
has high average end to end delay than SSRP. When 
pause time is between 200 seconds to 400 seconds, 
SSRP has high average end to end delay than AODV. In 
end, when pause time is between 400 seconds to 500 
seconds, SSRP has low average end to end delay than 
AODV. Therefore, on an average, SSRP outperforms 
AODV.   
Network throughput with respect to pause time 
has been shown in figure 16. SSRP gives high 
throughput than AODV and therefore, SSRP outperforms 
AODV in terms of throughput.  
Figure 17 shows normalized routing load by 
varying pause time. When the pause time is between 
100 seconds to 300 seconds, AODV shows higher 
normalized routing load than SSRP but when the pause 
time is between 300 seconds to 400 seconds, SSRP 
gives higher normalized routing load than SSRP. In end, 
both SSRP and AODV give almost same results. 
Concluding, it is inferred that SSRP outperforms AODV 
in terms of normalized routing load.  
In figure 18, AODV shows high packet loss than 
SSRP and therefore, SSRP outperforms than AODV. 
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Figure 15 : Average END To End Delay (50 Nodes) 
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Figure 18
 
:
 
Packet Loss (50 Nodes)
 
 
d) Simulation Results for 80 Nodes 
All the performance metrics have been 
evaluated for SSRP and AODV protocols using 14 UDP 
connections. All nodes are moving at a fixed speed of 
10 meters/second. Two malicious nodes have been 
introduced in the network scenarios which are moving at 
a speed of 5 meters/second. The pause time has been 
used as a varying parameter from 100 seconds to 950 
seconds and the queue length is 150.  
Figure 19 shows that packet delivery fraction for 
SSRP is much higher than that of AODV for all pause 
times and hence SSRP outperforms AODV in terms of 
better packet delivery. In figure 20, average end to end 
delay has been presented with respect to pause time. 
When the pause time is between 100 seconds to 675 
seconds, AODV has high average end to end delay than 
SSRP but when it is between 675 seconds to 950 
seconds, SSRP gives high average end to end delay 
than AODV. Concluding SSRP outperforms AODV 
initially but in end AODV starts outperforming SSRP. This 
issue is still under consideration. Network throughput 
with respect to pause time has been shown in figure 21. 
SSRP gives high throughput than AODV for all pause 
times and hence SSRP outperforms AODV in terms of 
better throughput.  
Figure 22 shows normalized routing load by 
varying pause time. The bigger this fraction is the less 
efficient the routing protocol. When the pause time is 
between 100 seconds to 250 seconds, SSRP shows 
bigger NRL than AODV; when it is between 250 seconds 
to 400 seconds, AODV shows bigger NRL than SSRP 
and when pause time is between 400 seconds to 950 
seconds, SSRP shows marginal bigger NRL than AODV. 
Although both the protocols give almost same results 
but still due to marginal difference between the results, 
on an average, AODV outperforms SSRP. In figure 23, 
the packet loss has been shown for both protocols with 
respect to varying pause time from 100 seconds to 950 
seconds. In all cases, SSRP gives very low packet loss 
than AODV and so SSRP outperforms AODV.  
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Figure 23  :  Packet Loss (80 Nodes)  
 
 
The existing routing protocols are typically 
attack-oriented. They first identify the security threats 
and then enhance the existing protocol to conquer such 
attacks. Since the solutions are designed explicitly with 
certain attack models in mind, they work well in the 
presence of designated attacks but may collapse under 
unanticipated attacks. Therefore, the ultimate goal for 
adhoc network security is to develop a multifold security 
solution that results in in-depth protection that offers 
multiple lines of defense against both known and 
unknown security threats. AODV is vulnerable to various 
kinds of attacks as it based on the assumption that all 
nodes must cooperate and without their cooperation no 
route can be established. In addition, when the 
malicious nodes enter into the network, various 
performance metrics begin decreasing for AODV. The 
objective of this research paper is to find a multifold 
security solution by developing a new on-demand stable 
and secure routing protocol, SSRP. The performance of 
this protocol has been evaluated with respect to AODV 
using five performance metrics viz. packet delivery 
fraction, average end to end delay, network throughput, 
normalized routing load and packet loss. It has been 
concluded that when the malicious nodes come into the 
way, the performance of SSRP is much better than that 
of AODV. Efforts are to increase the number of mobile 
nodes and to introduce more malicious nodes in the 
network scenario so that its impact on the network 
performance may be determined. The efforts can be 
made in the direction of improving hash functions to 
avoid collisions, using stronger hash keys by making 
them dependent on additional parameters like biometric 
credentials, passwords, IP addresses etc.  
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